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LABOR PROVISIONS IN TRADE AGREEMENTS:
FROM THE NAALC TO NOW
FRANK H. BIESZCZAT*
INTRODUCTION
The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) was
included as a side agreement to the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), and entered into force on January 1, 1994 by the governments of
Canada, Mexico, and the United States.' This note begins with a brief de-
scription of the background of the NAALC and then explores the process
by which a private party can bring a complaint against one of the party
governments for failing to comply with the agreement. Next is a short in-
troduction to current American goals in free trade agreements, as expressed
in the Trade Act of 2002. Following that is a discussion of some of the
successes and shortcomings of the NAALC as found in the agreement it-
self, and from its application over the last thirteen years. The next section is
a survey of some of the trade agreements entered into by the United States
since the NAALC. The final two sections examine how to improve the
NAALC itself, and includes proposed guidelines that can be used in future
trade agreements entered into by the United States. These proposals attempt
to tie together the lessons learned from the NAALC and other trade agree-
ments with the underlying goals of American trade policy regarding labor
conditions in order to create more efficient and effective trade agreements
in the future.
* Frank Bieszczat is currently a third year law student at Chicago-Kent College of Law. Prior to
law school he received a degree in English and Political Science from the University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign.
I. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 51, Sept. 14, 1993,
32 I.L.M. 1499 [hereinafter NAALC].
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I. THE NAALC
The NAALC was proposed by the United States as an addition to
NAFTA in response to domestic concerns that U.S. companies would relo-
cate to Mexico in order to take advantage of lower labor standards. 2 In the
1992 presidential election campaign, Bill Clinton included support of
NAFTA in his economic platform. 3 Clinton maintained he would support
NAFTA only if it included agreements designed to safeguard worker rights
and the environment. 4 The Mexican government was generally opposed to
the addition of new labor and environmental agreements to NAFTA. 5 Fur-
ther negotiations resulted in a compromised document which was viewed
by American labor activists as a watered-down version of what they were
trying to achieve. 6
The agreement's objectives are to improve working conditions and
living standards, encourage cooperation, and promote compliance with and
effective enforcement of each state's labor laws for the mutual benefit of
all parties to the treaty.7 Specifically, the agreement was designed to pro-
mote the following labor principles: 8
1) freedom of association and protection of the right to organize;
2) the right to bargain collectively;
3) the right to strike;
4) prohibition of forced labor;
5) labor protections for children and young persons;
6) minimum employment standards;
7) elimination of employment discrimination;
8) equal pay for women and men;
9) prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses;
10) compensation in cases of occupational injuries and illnesses; and
11) protection of migrant workers.9
2. John H. Knox, The 2005 Activity of the NAFTA Tribunals, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 429, 440
(2006) [hereinafter Knox, 2005].
3. Jenna L. Acuff, Comment, The Race to the Bottom: The United States' Influence on Mexican
Labor Law Enforcement, 5 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 387, 414 (2004).
4. Mark J. Russo, NAALC: A Tex-Mex Requiem for Labor Protection, 34 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
L. REv. 51, 57-58 (2002).
5. Acuff, supra note 3, at 414.
6. Id. at 415.
7. NAALC, supra note 1, art. 1.
8. Id. art. I (b).
9. Id. annex 1.
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While there is some vague language requiring the states to enact labor
laws and regulations which "provide for high labor standards,"'10 the
agreement's primary focus is ensuring enforcement by the states of their
own labor laws. 1" One provision specifically states that "[n]othing in this
Agreement shall be construed to empower a Party's authorities to under-
take labor law enforcement activities in the territory of another Party."'
12
Included in the agreement are guarantees that the system will be open to
private parties. 13 Specifically, private parties must have access to adminis-
trative, quasi-judicial, judicial, or labor tribunals in order to vindicate their
rights arising under labor laws. 14 Labor laws are defined as including occu-
pational health and safety, employment standards, industrial relations and
migrant workers, and collective agreements. 15 Numerous procedural pro-
tections are also required of the party states. 1
6
In order to execute the NAALC, each party is required to create a Na-
tional Administrative Office (NAO). 17 Each state must also designate a
Secretary, which is responsible for the administration and management of
the NAO. 18
A private party can begin the NAALC process by submitting a com-
plaint to the NAO of one of the two states not implicated in the submis-
sion. 19 For example, in order to submit a petition regarding American
enforcement of labor standards, the petition must be submitted to the NAO
of either Mexico or Canada. Upon receipt of the submission, the NAO can
then request consultations with the NAO of the state whose labor laws are
the subject of the submission. 20 The third NAO is entitled to participate in
the consultations if it so wishes.21 At this point, the NAO of the state that is
the subject of the submission must provide publicly-available data and
information to the other parties in order to assist the consulting NAOs.
22
10. Id. art. 2.
11. Id. art. 3.
12. Id. art. 42.
13. Id. art. 4(1).
14. Id.
15. Id. art. 4(2).
16. Id. art. 5.
17. Id. art. 15(1).
18. Id. art. 15(2).
19. Id. art. 16(3).
20. Id. art. 21(1).
21. Id. art. 21(3).
22. Id. art. 21(2).
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Any of the NAOs can also request ministerial consultations with the
NAO of another state in order to deal with any unresolved matters. 23
Again, if the third state feels that it has a substantial interest in the matter, it
can participate in the ministerial consultations as well. 24
If the matter is still not resolved, any of the parties can request the es-
tablishment of an Evaluation Committee of Experts (ECE). 25 The ECE is
comprised of three members who are independent experts in labor matters
or other matters central to the dispute. 26 An ECE may not be convened if
the matter is not trade-related or is not covered by mutually recognized
labor laws.27 First, the ECE presents a draft report that contains: "(a) a
comparative assessment of the matter under consideration; (b) its conclu-
sions; (c) and where appropriate, practical recommendations that may assist
the Parties in respect of the matter."'28 Following the draft report, each of
the parties can submit written views of the report to the ECE, which will be
taken into consideration by the ECE in the preparation of its final report. 29
The ECE's final evaluation report is presented to the Council,30 which
is comprised of labor ministers of the parties, and meets at least once a
year. 31 At this point, the parties provide written responses to the recom-
mendations made in the report to the Secretariat. 32 The Secretariat is ap-
pointed by the Council,33 and performs its duties under the direction of the
Council. 34 If the ECE's report concerns the enforcement of a state's occu-
pational safety and health, child labor, or minimum wage standards, then
either of the other two parties can request consultations with the investi-
gated party regarding whether there has been a persistent pattern of failing
to enforce the standards. 35
If the consultations fail to resolve the dispute, the matter then proceeds
to the Council, which may pursue one of three options. 36 First, the Council
can call on advisers and create working groups or expert groups. 37 Second,
23. Id. art. 22(1).
24. Id. art. 22(2).
25. Id. art. 23(1).
26. Id. art. 24(1).
27. Id. art. 23(3).
28. Id. art. 25(1).
29. Id. art. 25(2).
30, Id. art. 26(1).
31. Id. art. 9(1), (3)(a).
32. Id. art. 26(3).
33. Id. art. 12(1).
34. Id. art. 10(1)(b).
35. Id. art. 27(1).
36. Id. art. 28(4).
37. Id. art. 28(4)(a).
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the Council may "have recourse to good offices, conciliation, mediation or
such other dispute resolution procedures. '38 Third, the Council may make
recommendations privately, or publicly with a two-thirds vote, so as to
assist the parties to reach a "mutually satisfactory resolution. '39
If the matter still has not been resolved, the Council shall, upon the re-
quest of any of the consulting parties and by a two-thirds vote, convene an
arbitral panel.40 The arbitral panel consists of five members. 41 The disput-
ing parties are required to agree on the chair of the panel, and if that is im-
possible, the disputing party shall select as chair a person who is not a
citizen of the disputing party's state.42 After the chair is selected, each of
the two disputing parties choose two panelists who are citizens of the other
disputing party.43 The panel is authorized to seek information and advice
from any person or body it deems appropriate, so long as the disputing
parties agree to it. 44 Within 180 days of the formation of the panel, it is to
present an initial report to the disputing parties containing findings of fact,
its determination as to whether there has been a persistent pattern of failure
to enforce, and recommendations regarding the resolution of the dispute. 45
Any of the disputing parties can submit written comments to the panel in
response to the initial report;46 thereafter, the panel submits and publishes
its final report. 47
If the panel finds a persistent pattern of non-enforcement, then the
disputing parties may agree on a mutually satisfactory action plan that
should normally conform with the determinations and recommendations of
the panel.48 If the parties cannot agree on an action plan, any party may
request that the panel reconvene so the party can propose an action plan. 49
The reconvened panel can then approve a plan submitted by the com-
plained-against party or establish a plan consistent with the complained-
against party's laws. 50 The panel can also impose a monetary enforcement
assessment where warranted.5 1
38. Id. art. 28(4)(b).
39. Id. art. 28(4)(c).
40. Id. art. 29(1).
41. Id. art. 32(1)(a).
42. Id. art. 32(1)(b).
43. Id. art. 32(I)(c).
44. Id. art. 35.
45. Id. art. 36(2).
46. Id. art. 36(4).
47. Id. art. 37.
48. Id. art. 38.
49. Id. art. 39(1).
50. Id. art. 39(4)(a).
51. Id. art. 39(4)(b).
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A party may also ask the panel to reconvene in a situation where the
parties agreed to a mutually satisfactory action plan, but there is a dispute
as to whether the complained-against party is fully implementing that
plan.5 2 If the reconvened panel decides that the complained-against party is
not fully implementing the agreed-upon action plan, the panel shall impose
a monetary enforcement assessment. 53 Any actions taken by the recon-
vened panel are final. 54 A complaining party still has the option at any time
to request that the panel reconvene in order to determine whether the com-
plained-against party is fully implementing the action plan.55 If a party fails
to pay a monetary enforcement assessment, that party may have its NAFTA
benefits suspended in order to collect what is necessary to pay the assess-
ment. 56
II. AMERICAN LABOR GOALS IN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS
In the Trade Act of 2002, Congress explicitly outlined the current
trade negotiating objectives of the United States.57 Included in these objec-
tives are:
to promote respect for worker rights and the rights of children consistent
with core labor standards of the ILO... and an understanding of the re-
lationship between trade and worker rights; 58 ...
to seek provisions in trade agreements under which parties to those
agreements strive to ensure that they do not weaken or reduce the protec-
tions afforded in domestic environmental and labor laws as an encour-
agement for trade; 59 [and]
to promote universal ratification and full compliance with ILO Conven-
tion No. 182 Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor.60
The statute goes on to list the "core labor standards" of the ILO that
are to be promoted:
A) the right of association; B) the right to organize and bargain collec-
tively; C) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory
labor; D) a minimum age for the employment of children; and E) accept-
52. Id. art. 39(l)(b).
53. Id. art. 39(5)(b).
54. Id. art. 39(6).
55. Id. art. 40.
56. Id. art. 41(1)(b).
57. 19 U.S.C. § 3802 (Supp. II 2002).
58. Id. § 3802(a)(6).
59. Id. § 3802(a)(7).
60. Id. § 3802(a)(9).
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able conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work,
and occupational safety and health.61
NAFTA and the NAALC were negotiated and passed prior to the pas-
sage of the Trade Act of 2002. The goals and objectives found in the statute
can be used as a template by which to judge the NAALC, since that statute
embodies the current free trade goals of the United States. If the NAALC is
in fact successfully promoting the goals favored by Congress and the Presi-
dent, then it would stand to reason that similar agreements will have been
included in or alongside subsequent trade agreements. In fact, since the
Trade Act of 2002, every major trade agreement negotiated by the United
States has included a labor provision in the main text. 62
III. SHORTCOMINGS AND SUCCESSES OF THE NAALC
While some analysis of the NAALC has been positive, the majority
opinion among commentators is that the agreement has failed to live up to
its goals.63 The primary criticism has been its lack of enforceability. The
enforceability shortcomings were almost immediately apparent as the first
four petitions pursued under the agreement failed to achieve concrete re-
sults. 64
A. Lack of "Hard" Enforcement Mechanisms
One of the main criticisms regarding enforceability has been the un-
availability of sanctions for breaching a majority of the agreement's princi-
ples.65 A state can only face sanctions for failing to enforce occupational
safety and health, child labor, or minimum wage standards. 66 The glaring
61. Id. § 3813(6).
62. Alisa DiCaprio, Are Labor Provisions Protectionist? Evidence From Nine Labor-Augmented
U.S. Trade Arrangements, 26 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 1 (2004).
63. See Jonathan Graubart, "Politicizing" a New Breed of "Legalized" Transnational Political
Opportunity Structures: Labor Activists Uses of NAFTA 's Citizen-Petition Mechanism, 26 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 97, 106-14 (2005); John H. Knox, Separated at Birth: The North American Agreements
on Labor and the Environment, 26 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 359, 377 (2004) [hereinafter
Knox, Separated at Birth]; Knox, 2005, supra note 2, at 440-42; Edward Mazey, Grieving Through the
NAALC and the Social Charter: A Comparative Analysis of Their Procedural Effectiveness, 10 MICH.
STATE UNIV. DETROIT COLL. L. J. INT'L L. 239, 239 (2001); Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, The "Helping
Hand" in Trade Agreements: An Analysis of and Proposal for Labor Provisions in U.S. Free Trade
Agreements, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 845, 876-80 (2004); Acuff, supra note 3, at 414-29; Chantell Taylor,
Note, NAFTA, GATT, and the Current Free Trade System: A Dangerous Double Standard for Workers'
Rights, 28 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 401,415-19 (2000).
64. Graubart, supra note 63, at 110.
65. Pagnattaro, supra note 63, at 877.
66. Id.
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omission is the failure to provide sanctions for violations of the right to
organize and bargain collectively.
Substituting for the "hard" enforcement mechanisms are varying de-
grees of "soft" mechanisms, which may further dilute the effectiveness of
the agreement. Thus far, no petition has been able to reach the procedural
stage of an ECE report. 67 The NAO report may actually serve as an obsta-
cle for the petitioner, because it could lessen the political pressure placed
on the government. Undoubtedly some of the supporters of the petition will
interpret the NAO report as a victory and significantly reduce or end sup-
port for pursuing any further measures.
The most common remedy for violations thus far has been ministerial
consultation. 68 These consultations tend to achieve little, and have typically
concluded with training sessions or the creation of a committee. 69 This
result leads to petitioner frustration, as even a successful petition accom-
plishes nothing more than what is perceived as a public relations move by
the party governments. Given the resources necessary to achieve this tooth-
less result, petitioners are disincentivized from utilizing the NAALC peti-
tion process again in the future. 70 In addition to the substantial resources
necessary to petition within the process effectively, private citizens have to
deal with the consequences of what will most likely be a negative reaction
by their employers, further discouraging the submission of petitions in the
first place.71
B. Over-Reliance on Governmental Action
Another problem is the agreement's failure to provide roles for non-
governmental actors in the enforcement process. 72 Non-governmental ac-
tors (NGOs) do not file complaints directly, but rather through a given
government's NAO. 73 Perhaps a better solution is found in the environ-
mental side agreement, where the procedure is administered by an inde-
pendent body rather than the states themselves. 74 It has been suggested that
independent reports are more likely to be effective than governmental re-
67. Knox, Separated at Birth, supra note 63, at 381.




72. Knox, Separated at Birth, supra note 63, at 359.
73. Id. at 374.
74. Id. at 375.
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ports, and that governments will only authorize these reports if they are
under the continuing pressure of some independent bodies. 75
One reason why an independent body may be more effective than a
government in enforcing the NAALC is a government's fear of subsequent
retaliatory investigations directed at itself.76 For example, the United States
may be less willing to vigorously pursue a petition against Mexico if the
United States is worried that Mexico may respond by pursuing a claim
against the United States about failures to enforce American labor stan-
dards regarding migrant workers. "Allowing non-governmental actors to
raise claims of noncompliance may avoid this governmental bottleneck,
since they do not share the concerns that dissuade governments from act-
ing."'77 The record indicates governments are not motivated to pursue
claims against the other states, as no government has ever brought a claim
against another in the history of the NAALC. 78
Another effect of relying on governments rather than an independent
body to enforce the NAALC is that it invites allegations of bad faith en-
forcement by the governments, and further discourages the use of the proc-
ess. The purpose underlying all independent or impartial judicial organs is
to divorce biases from the process. So long as governments continue to fill
the enforcement role, they are not really binding themselves to anything
more than the continued pursuit of their own objectives. If this is the case,
then many will see the NAALC as nothing more than a sham agreement
negotiated by the governments in order to appease local opposition groups.
In the end, though, the opposition groups do not achieve the goals they
were pursuing, and the NAALC almost loses its status as a treaty because it
fails to bind the parties to take action.
C. Success Through Public Awareness and Political Pressure
Despite the criticisms of all the shortcomings of the NAALC, it does
seem to be of some value. The NAALC has been successful in creating
opportunities for groups to publicize instances of labor rights violations,
and this publicity has been translated into some substantive changes. 79 For
example, the Mexican government launched an informational campaign in
the maquiladora zone of Mexico to educate female workers on their legal
75. Id. at 376.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 377.
79. Graubart, supra note 63, at 119-20.
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rights regarding pregnancy discrimination. 80 The Quebec government cre-
ated a special council to address illegal plant closings designed to avoid
unions. 81 In the State of Washington, the state government increased the
amount of resources allocated to enforcing health and safety standards in
regard to migrant workers, and one of the large apple growing companies
relaxed its union certification procedure.82 These results are not the hard
sanctions or fines that many critics of the NAALC are looking for, but they
demonstrate where the NAALC has been utilized to achieve the goals that
are supposedly at the center of the agreement.
The problem with these successes is they indicate that in order to
make the best use of the NAALC, you need to have a well-funded and
highly organized group directing the procedure. The NAALC successes
were the product of "a series of legally sophisticated and well-researched
petitions... all of which involved extensive political mobilization and the
participation of multiple actors."'83 The organizations which operated as the
driving forces included the AFL-CIO and the United Steel Workers,84 or-
ganizations that enjoy extensive resources and organization. These groups
are accessible because they welcome confrontation with governments
rather than avoid them, but the truly powerless and voiceless may not be
able to catch the eye of these organizations. Many of the people affected by
the NAALC are no doubt unaware of this phenomenon and unable to gen-
erate the political support necessary to access it even if they are. If the
NAALC were truly designed to allow private individuals the ability to
bring complaints against governments, then there seem to be significant
shortcomings. It is not private individuals that bring complaints, but rather
large NGOs that pick and choose cases according to their own agendas.
An argument can be made to the contrary: a process that requires a fil-
tering of claims prior to the complaint stage is preferable. If the system
were made so accessible that any private individual could bring a claim, the
number of claims could create significant inefficiencies and conflict with
the original and ongoing intentions of the state parties. A high volume of
claims could conceivably dilute the available pool of resources for each
complaint. The complaints that have enjoyed some success within the
NAALC have done so by utilizing large campaigns to capture public
awareness.
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An additional limitation on the publicity strategy, whereby the goal is
to force states into action by creating negative publicity, is uncertainty re-
garding its effectiveness for all complaints. For example, a violation by a
Mexican company involving Mexican workers may not evoke the same
emotional response in the American or Canadian public as would abuses by
a company of one's own state. Much of the public might point to the lack
of a domestic connection as a reason not to get involved. A lessened emo-
tional response could prove to be fatal, since the strategy relies on strong
and continued public pressure.
The level of success attained and prospectively available is hard to de-
termine and arguable. One sign, though, that the successes have been
somewhat substantial is the continued use of the procedure by petitioners. 85
This measure may not turn out to be very authoritative, since the number of
annual submissions has been declining.86 Especially telling may be the fact
that while the quantity of submissions under the NAALC has been declin-
ing, the number of submissions under the other NAFTA tribunals has been
increasing.87 This seems to be more of a trend than an anomaly as half as
many submissions were made in the years 1999-2005 than were made in
the years 1993-1999.88
IV. TRADE AGREEMENTS SINCE THE NAALC
A. U.S. -Jordan Free Trade Agreement
The first trade agreement to include labor criteria directly in the main
text is the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement (Jordan FTA). 89 The Jordan
FTA was signed on October 24, 2000, and was the last trade agreement
signed by the United States during the Clinton administration. 90 The
agreement is similar to the NAALC in that it is based upon the countries
enforcing their own labor laws.91 The Jordan FTA also envisions the par-
ties working together to find solutions through consultations. 92 If consulta-
tions prove to be unsuccessful, the matter is sent to the Joint Committee, 93
85. Knox, Separated at Birth, supra note 63, at 379.
86. Id. at 380.
87. Knox, 2005, supra note 2, at 441.
88. Id.
89. DiCaprio, supra note 62, at 13.
90. Pagnattaro, supra note 63, at 878-80.
91. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on
the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan art. 6(4)(a) Oct. 24, 2002, 41 I.L.M. 63.
92. Id. art. 16.
93. Id. art. 17(1)(b).
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and if necessary to an appointed panel. 94 The panel then generates a report
including recommendations for the resolution of the dispute. 95 If the parties
are unable to come to a resolution through the Joint Committee and the
panel, the affected party then has the authorization to "take any appropriate
and commensurate measure."
'96
The procedure outlined in the Jordan FTA differs significantly from
the NAALC in its brevity and breadth of options for a complaining party.
Theoretically, one party would have the authority to impose sanctions upon
the other for breaching its commitments. Sanctions are unlikely, however,
as in 2001 the parties exchanged letters indicating it was unlikely that the
U.S. would suspend benefits to Jordan.
97
Unlike the NAALC, the labor provisions of the Jordan FTA are incor-
porated into the agreement itself, rather than relegated to side agreement
status.98 Here, the labor provisions are not watered down because they are
tied to the enforcement mechanisms regarding the central issues of the
agreement. 99 Therefore, labor standards should receive the same protec-
tions that apply to the central trade issues that are the primary subject of the
agreement.
Despite the many distinctions, one similarity between the Jordan FTA
and the NAALC is that both agreements were signed prior to the passage of
the Trade Act of 2002.100 This fact could be important when looking back
to these agreements for the purpose of drafting new agreements in the post-
Trade Act world. In the case of the Jordan FTA, this may not be as impor-
tant because the Jordan FTA incorporates many of the same purposes and
objectives that are found in the Trade Act. Specifically, both the Trade Act
and the Jordan FTA rely heavily on the principles central to the creation
and operation of the International Labor Organization (ILO).lOl
The ILO was created by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 and was later
adopted by the United Nations. 102 The overarching goal of the ILO is to
promote the acceptance and enforcement of minimum labor standards
globally through conventions, guidelines, and recommendations. 103 The
94. Id. art. 17(1)(c).
95. Id. art 17(1)(d).
96. Id- art. 17(2)(b).
97. DiCaprio, supra note 62, at 14.
98. Pagnattaro, supra note 63, at 879.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 880.
101. Id. at 879.
102. Developments in the Law-Jobs and Borders, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2171, 2205 (2005).
103. Id.
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current approach by the ILO focuses on eight "core" labor conventions that
exist within four standards. 10 4 The four standards are "(a) freedom of asso-
ciation and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining;
(b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor; (c) the effec-
tive abolition of child labour; and (d) the elimination of discrimination in
respect of employment and occupation."'105 Jordan has ratified seven of the
eight core conventions, and according to the terms of the agreement, the
United States could seek dispute resolution if Jordan failed to perform its
obligations under the ILO. 10 6 Again, though, the "governmental bottle-
neck" problem re-emerges as a hindrance to vigorous enforcement. 107 An-
other problem is that the one core convention that Jordan has not ratified
deals with freedom of association and the right to organize. 108 Therefore,
one of the most important provisions is absent.
The Jordan FTA also includes one of the key safeguards found in the
NAALC. There is an "anti-relaxation" clause included in the agreement
which prohibits states from changing their own domestic laws regarding
labor standards to decrease the amount of protections provided for private
citizens. 109 Therefore, in order to comply with the agreements, a state can-
not simply repeal existing labor laws to the detriment of labor standards.
In the end, though, no matter how well-written the agreement or treaty
is, it will be ineffective if the parties do not have the political will to ade-
quately enforce the provisions of the agreement. This seems to be the case
with the Jordan FTA, as the U.S. in 2001 essentially promised that it would
not suspend benefits to Jordan. 1 10 Therefore, the Jordan FTA can be seen as
a model by which to craft an agreement that will more effectively bind the
parties to the goal of improving labor conditions in concert with the bene-
fits of free trade. Alternatively, it can be viewed as an even more clever
exercise than the NAALC in placating anti-free trade, pro-labor standards
groups while not imposing any real obligations on any of the parties.
B. Bilateral Trade Agreements After the Trade Act of 2002
Following the Trade Act of 2002, the United States has entered into a
number of trade agreements including free trade agreements with Singa-
104. Id. at2206.
105. Id.
106. Pagnattaro, supra note 63, at 879.
107. Knox, Separated at Birth, supra note 63, at 376.
108. Pagnattaro, supra note 63, at 879.
109. Id. at 880.
110. DiCaprio, supra note 62, at 14.
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pore, Chile, Australia, Bahrain, and Morocco."'1 These agreements resem-
ble the Jordan FTA much more than the NAALC. Like the Jordan FTA, all
of these agreements are bilateral agreements between the U.S. and the part-
ner state, and all of these agreements include labor provisions in the main
text of the agreement.11 2 Just like the NAALC and Jordan FTA, these labor
provisions operate by guaranteeing compliance with a party's own labor
laws. 113 Some of the same criticisms of prior labor provisions have been
levied against these agreements as well, including the lack of an imposition
of new heightened standards and the lack of any "hard enforcement mecha-
nisms." 114
C. CAFTA
On May 28, 2004, the United States entered into the United States-
Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) with Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. 115 The Dominican Repub-
lic signed the agreement later, on August 5, 2004.116
CAFTA includes a chapter addressing labor. 117 In it, all states reaffirm
their obligations as members of the ILO, but only "strive" to ensure that
such labor rights are protected by their laws. 118 CAFTA defines these labor
rights as the rights to organize and bargain collectively, prohibitions against
forced labor, protections against child labor, and minimum health and
safety standards. 119 The use of the word "strive" has been criticized as
merely setting a goal, rather than a requirement, that the countries abide by
international labor standards. 120
Each state is charged with enforcing its own labor laws, and is given
significant discretion in doing so. 12 1 A state is in compliance with the
agreement whenever "a course of action or inaction reflects a reasonable
111. Developments in the Law-Jobs and Borders, supra note 102, at 2214.
112. DiCaprio, supra note 62, at 1.
113. Id. at 14-15.
114. Developments in the Law-Jobs and Borders, supra note 102, at 2214.
115. Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, Leveling the Playing Field: Labor Provisions in CAFTA, 29
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 386, 386 (2006).
116. Id.
117. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Cent. Am.-Dom. Am., ch. 16, Aug. 5, 2004, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade -Agreements/Bilatera/CAFTA/CAFTA-DR-Final-Texts/asset--up
load-file320_3936.pdf [hereinafter CAFTA-DR].
118. Id. art. 16.1(1).
119. Id. art. 16.8.
120. Pagnattaro, supra note 115, at 434.
121. CAFTA-DR, supra note 117, art. 16.2.
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exercise" of a state's discretion in enforcing its own labor laws. 122 In fact,
third parties are expressly forbidden from enforcing a state's labor laws. 123
A state that fails to enforce its own labor laws does face the prospect of a
possible monetary penalty, but the penalty is capped at $15 million annu-
ally and requires a lengthy, cumbersome process essentially identical to
that of the NAALC. 1
24
The shortcomings of the labor provisions of CAFTA mirror those of
the NAALC, and represent a step backward from previous agreements such
as the Jordan FTA. CAFTA fails to deliver effective hard enforcement
mechanisms by creating an unnecessarily lengthy procedure, which pre-
cedes a relatively insignificant fine. The reasonableness requirement ap-
plied to the states gives them significant discretion regarding labor law
enforcement, and creates a safe haven for inadequate enforcement.
V. HOW TO FIX THE NAALC
It is not yet so late in the game that the NAALC cannot be saved from
the precipice of death and irrelevance. Modifications can be made to the
text of the agreement, and changes can be made in the way the text is inter-
preted and executed. The political landscape is different now than it was at
the time of enactment in each of the three member countries, and it is con-
ceivable that this change in context may facilitate a change in the workings
of the agreement.
A. Looking to the Rest ofNAFTA for Answers
It seems that the majority of the shortcomings of the NAALC could be
solved by providing for an enforcement mechanism that works independ-
ently from the governments. It would make sense to model the NAALC on
the other, more effective side agreement to NAFTA involving environ-
mental standards. A short exploration of the environmental side agreement
illustrates its superiority.
The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
(NAAEC) resembles the NAALC in many ways. Like the NAALC, the
NAAEC was conceived of as a means by which to address American pub-
lic resistance to NAFTA.125 The concern was that U.S. companies would
122. Id. art. 16.2(1)(b).
123. Id. art. 16.2(3).
124. Bryan D. Gerbracht, Note, Export Processing Zones and Free Trade Agreements: Lessons
from the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, 16 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
1029, 1051-52 (2007).
125. Knox, 2005, supra note 2, at 438.
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rush to Mexico in order to take advantage of low Mexican environmental
standards. 126 Just as in the labor sector, the Mexican environmental stan-
dards on the books are comparable to their American counterparts. 127 The
difference is that there are significantly lower rates of compliance with
those standards in Mexico. 128 The NAAEC operates by requiring parties to
enforce their own environmental laws, and does provide for a citizen sub-
missions procedure through which an NGO can claim that a government is
failing in its enforcement.
129
The key difference found between the processes in the NAALC and
the NAAEC is that in the environmental agreement citizen submissions are
filed with the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC), an inde-
pendent international organization created by the NAAEC. 130 The CEC
reviews the submission and then decides whether it is sufficient. 131 If it is,
the CEC then requests a response from the government implicated in the
submission. 132 It is this point at which the governments have input into the
fate of the submission. If the Secretariat believes further investigation is
warranted by the submission and the response, it goes to the representatives
of the governments and this group then decides if the Secretariat should
prepare a "factual record."' 133
The factual record is essentially an investigation into whether there is
evidence that supports the submission. 134 This is not the kind of hard en-
forcement mechanism many advocates may be looking for. On the other
hand, this is a more effective form of soft enforcement than that found in
the NAALC. The record indicates petitioners have enjoyed a far greater
rate of success through the NAAEC than their counterparts have with the
NAALC. As of 2005, 45% of submissions have achieved recommendations
for factual records from the Secretariat. 135 Of those, 89% have survived
governmental scrutiny and proceeded to the stage of a factual record. 13
6
These numbers may indicate why it is that the NAAEC process has been










135. Id. at 439.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 441.
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The difference in results emanates, in a large part, from the independ-
ence of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation and the Secre-
tariat. 138 The fact that only 45% of submissions have resulted in a
recommendation by the Secretariat for factual records is an indication that
the Secretariat is performing its function as an initial filter of submis-
sions. 139 On the other hand, that number is high enough to indicate that the
Secretariat is willing to confront the governments, and not merely bow to
the political forces that make enforcement of the NAALC so difficult.
Despite the many ways in which the NAAEC process has been suc-
cessful, there have been a number of shortcomings as well. For example,
the Secretariat's ability to elicit consent by the governments to create fac-
tual records has been accompanied by serious reservations and limitations
regarding the scope and content of the investigations. 140 Another problem
involves the governments' ability to withhold consent for factual records
for a significant period of time. 141 This holdup tactic can create an ineffi-
cient process similar to that of the NAALC. The inefficiencies of the
NAAEC process would most likely be less harmful than those of the
NAALC process, though, because of the independence of the Secretariat.
Whereas the success of a complaint under the NAALC is reliant upon the
continued support and active participation of one of the governments, an
independent Secretariat is not subject to declining public support and con-
cern as a motivation to abandon the complaint.
B. Providing for an Independent Body Within the NAALC
Many of the problems currently faced by the NAALC would be solved
with the creation of some sort of independent body to review and pursue
complaints against states. This measure would accomplish a number of
goals.
First, it would create greater legitimacy for the system in the eyes of
activists and the public in general. The declining use of the NAALC is an
indication of this loss in faith in the process.
A second, related benefit is that it will significantly reduce reliance
upon political will to achieve enforcement. The primary purpose of the
NAALC's citizen petition system is to hold governments accountable in
enforcing their own labor standards. The fact that these complaints exist in
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the first place is evidence that governments are not always willing to abide
by these standards on their own. Complaints have been brought against all
three party governments to NAFTA, indicating that none of the govern-
ments may have the requisite political will to enforce labor standards be-
cause of the fear that they might be the subject of scrutiny next time. It
seems nearly impossible that the NAALC's goals will be achieved through
a process that relies upon state action, because the benefits of pursuing a
complaint against another state party almost never outweigh the costs, both
political and financial, that accompany such a plan of action.
Governments will probably be hostile to any arrangement that divests
them of a certain level of control. Nonetheless, this option may not be
completely politically unfeasible since, after all, this is the arrangement that
was agreed to in the NAAEC. 142 It may be wise for labor activists to divert
attention and resources from pursuing NAALC petitions to applying pres-
sure on the governments to provide for an independent body with more
power and discretion within the NAALC itself.
VI. THE FUTURE OF LABOR PROVISIONS IN TRADE AGREEMENTS
Currently, the preferred avenue by which to address global labor stan-
dards is through trade agreements that include labor standards provisions.
The labor provisions have been substantially similar across the board, and
have not been molded with the intent of accommodating the different con-
texts that exist within different domestic labor spheres. As American poli-
cymakers contemplate the prospect of using future trade agreements to
achieve improved labor standards globally, it is important to apply lessons
from recent history to future circumstances. The end result could range
from ending this practice altogether, to following an identical template, to
radically changing the terms and content of future agreements. Bilateral
trade agreements can be used to improve labor standards, but in order to be
successful, there needs to be a shift in the prioritization of certain goals.
A. Focus on Rights To Organize and Bargain Collectively
If there is one labor standards principle which should be promoted
above all others in future labor provisions, it is the right to organize and
bargain collectively. The labor agreements that the U.S. has entered into
have not done an effective job of highlighting this principle. This is espe-
cially apparent in the Jordan FTA, where all of the core conventions of the
142. Id. at 438.
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ILO are protected with the exception of freedom of association and the
right to organize. 14
3
One of the important contributions of the NAALC is that it allows for
private citizen submissions in addition to submissions made by a govern-
ment. This signals that one of the purposes behind the NAALC was to al-
low private individuals some level of control over their own working
conditions. The fact that all of the labor provisions the United States has
agreed to since the NAALC also contain some mechanism by which private
individuals can bring claims against governments for labor standards viola-
tions implies that some private control is still desirable. 144 Private control is
desirable because governments generally do not want to get caught up in
the business of governing someone else's state, and governments are also
generally resistant to foreign governments meddling in domestic affairs. It
is also more costly for the government of a given state to represent workers
from another state because there are more transaction costs. There are bar-
riers in language, culture, and geography that need to be overcome. If these
barriers are not overcome, then the workers are left with a relatively in-
competent representative.
The most effective way to ensure private control over the interests of
the workers is through the formation of unions. A union which grows out
of a group of employees, and is held directly accountable to them, faces
significantly less transaction costs than a foreign government. Additionally,
there is less need for foreign interference because the unions will be able to
perform the oversight function that is outlined for governments in the
NAALC and other agreements.
Another benefit of the strengthening of local unions is greater gov-
ernmental flexibility in regard to labor standards. Agreements like the
NAALC obligate governments to enforce the labor standards found in their
own laws. In many countries, including Mexico, the laws protecting labor
are excellent, but the problem appears in lack of enforcement. 145 The
NAALC theoretically takes care of this problem by addressing the en-
forcement of the laws rather than the laws themselves. The problem is that
many governments have no intention of complying with these standards
because they may be artificially high. These standards may have been de-
veloped as a mere public relations ploy, and perhaps there was never any
intent to follow them. In fact, the standards may be so high that they would
significantly threaten the state's economic well-being and comparative
143. Pagnattaro, supra note 63, at 879.
144. DiCaprio, supra note 62, at 1.
145. Acuff, supra note 3, at 388-89.
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advantages in cheap labor were they to be fully enforced. If unions were
allowed to develop, employers and governments might be able to negotiate
a middle ground with workers.
For example, assume that we can objectively assign some number to
states' working conditions, with "level 1" indicating poor compliance with
labor standards and poor working conditions, and "level 10" indicating
perfect compliance and excellent working conditions. Assume further that
a hypothetical state has excellent laws on the books regarding labor stan-
dards. Were these standards fully enforced, working conditions in the state
would reach level 8. The government realizes that there would be practi-
cally no foreign investment in the state if labor standards were that high.
The cost to produce would be so high that there would be no incentive for
foreign corporations to enter the state and employ its citizens. Therefore,
the government does not enforce these standards at all, and the actual work-
ing conditions in the state fall to level 2. The optimal scenario would be for
working conditions to be at level 5. Level 5 is low enough that there will
still be strong incentives for foreign companies to invest in the state. On the
other hand, level 5 is good for the workers because it is a significant in-
crease in working conditions, and as a result, the quality of life of a worker
will improve as well.
The government is extremely reluctant to enforce any of the labor
standards laws because it fears that giving any ground on the subject will
motivate workers and foreign labor activists to push for full enforcement
that will drive investors out of the state and cripple the national economy.
The government would be willing to change its labor standards to a lesser
standard and then enforce them at that standard because that would not
threaten foreign investment. Unfortunately, the state is locked into a free
trade agreement with the United States that does not allow the government
to reduce its stated labor standards. Therefore the state will be unable to
change its laws according to the treaty it signed with the United States, but
it will not enforce its existing labor standards either, because that would
hurt the national economy and the United States is not putting the govern-
ment under any great pressure to enforce them anyway.
If the state had instead signed an agreement with the United States
which focused primarily on protecting laws that allow for free organization
and the right to bargain collectively, things right be different. First, work-
ers would have better representation because their unions would have much
stronger motivations to scrutinize government enforcement of labor stan-
dards than the United States government. Additionally, the state's govern-
ment would not be locked into the existing labor standards laws, and would
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then be in a better position to negotiate. Through the information ex-
changes that occur during negotiations, both parties will become aware that
heightened labor standards will actually hurt the workers' chances for em-
ployment, and also that labor conditions need to improve if the government
does not want a strike on its hands. The parties will come to an agreement
that a relaxation of labor standard laws to something that resembles level 4
or 5 is agreeable, so long as those standards are fully enforced.
The government is happy because it gets to take the unrealistically
burdensome labor standards laws off the books and maintains its compara-
tive advantage in luring foreign investment. The workers are happy because
their working conditions have improved without costing them much in
terms of the number of employment opportunities. The United States is
happy because it has not had to get involved in the domestic labor relations
of the state. Additionally, the improved labor standards pacify labor activ-
ists, and American companies are still happy because they can still invest in
the state and make a profit. While this scenario is no doubt an idealized
one, it illustrates the possible benefits that can result from protecting the
rights to organize and bargain collectively if all of the parties involved act
in a rational and reasonable manner while still pursuing their best interests.
B. Bilateral vs. Multilateral Agreements
It is important to note the differences that exist between bilateral and
multilateral trade agreements. Bilateral trade agreements have the advan-
tage of reducing negotiating and enforcement costs by limiting the number
of parties involved. Multilateral agreements can reduce costs on a greater
scale. By creating a free trade zone which encompasses a number of states,
each of the states reaps the benefits of a diversified pool of comparative
advantages. Additionally, multilateral treaties make things a little easier on
the United States because they create consistent obligations. This benefit
can also be achieved through consistent bilateral agreements. So long as the
United States' obligations remain the same throughout, the United States
does not worry about having to constantly make sure that its activities are
in accordance with numerous standards.
The preferred strategy may be to broker a number of bilateral treaties
that are essentially identical. In this context the focus on protecting the
rights to organize and bargain collectively becomes even more important
because that provides for the contextual flexibility lacking in a system of
identical agreements across different countries and regions. The reason this
strategy may be preferred is because the negotiation costs are much lower
when negotiating an agreement between two parties. Therefore, each
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agreement will cost less in negotiation. Many of the countries that struggle
with problems with labor conditions would benefit significantly by being
party to a free trade agreement with the United States, and that potential
economic gain would create an incentive for these countries to agree to the
terms of the standard agreement.
It would also be a wise move to have the standard labor conditions in
these agreements closely resemble international labor standards. Therefore,
these countries would be more able to form agreements with other coun-
tries, and the goal of a unified global marketplace would become more
attainable.
